Agency research in managerial accounting: A second look

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

1976 • 62,465 citations

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism

1987 • 15,724 citations

Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.

1976 • 13,953 citations

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism

1986 • 11,014 citations

Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm

1980 • 10,487 citations

Moral Hazard and Observability

1979 • 8,356 citations

Positive Accounting Theory

1985 • 6,198 citations

Moral Hazard in Teams

1982 • 4,935 citations

Reputation and imperfect information

1982 • 3,115 citations

Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification

1979 • 3,041 citations

Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives

1987 • 2,932 citations

Corporate culture and economic theory

1990 • 2,152 citations

Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem

1985 • 1,888 citations

Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation

1988 • 1,881 citations

Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory

1988 • 1,734 citations

The theory of contracts

1987 • 1,374 citations

Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly

1987 • 1,320 citations

Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms

1986 • 1,235 citations

An Analysis of the use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts

1987 • 1,102 citations

The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives

1987 • 972 citations

Advanced Management Accounting

1983 • 918 citations

Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation

1989 • 917 citations

The theory of the firm

1987 • 900 citations

A Theory of Wage Dynamics

1982 • 851 citations

The economic consequences of accounting choice implications of costly contracting and monitoring

1983 • 796 citations

Organization Theory and Methodology

1998 • 774 citations

Earnings Management in an Overlapping Generations Model

1988 • 767 citations

An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives

1986 • 721 citations

Managerial Incentives and Capital Management

1986 • 716 citations

Repeated Moral Hazard

1985 • 635 citations

Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships

1990 • 512 citations

Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts

1986 • 507 citations

On the Economics of Transfer Pricing

1956 • 496 citations

Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation

1982 • 488 citations

Tax Planning, Regulatory Capital Planning, and Financial Reporting Strategy for Commercial Banks

1990 • 473 citations

Accounting for Stewardship

1981 • 440 citations

The association between performance plan adoption and corporate capital investment

1983 • 415 citations

Executive compensation and executive incentive problems

1987 • 383 citations

Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems

1980 • 375 citations

Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance

1984 • 347 citations

Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard

1983 • 335 citations

Merger decisions and executive stock ownership in acquiring firms

1985 • 325 citations

Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory

1988 • 229 citations

Transaction cost economics

1987 • 205 citations

Handbook of industrial organization

1991 • 188 citations

The Methodology of Positive Accounting

2007 • 172 citations

Advanced management accounting

1982 • 160 citations

Optimal Contracts with a Utility-Maximizing Auditor

1987 • 147 citations

Corporate Culture and Economic Theory

1996 • 146 citations

Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies

1986 • 133 citations

The search for gain in markets and firms: A review of the historical emergence of management accounting systems

1983 • 130 citations

Value of communication in agencies

1989 • 128 citations

Management accounting systems and the economics of internal organization

1983 • 85 citations

Monitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model

1985 • 72 citations

Management Compensation Contracts and Merger-Induced Abnormal Returns

1987 • 65 citations

Organizational views of transfer pricing

1982 • 58 citations

Noncontrollable Costs and Responsibility Accounting

1985 • 58 citations

Advanced Managerial Accounting

1986 • 49 citations

Management compensation and the managerial labor market an overview

1985 • 41 citations

The Use of Core Theory in Evaluating Joint Cost Allocation Schemes

2016 • 39 citations

On the Optimality of Menus of Linear Contracts

1987 • 35 citations

Overhead Allocation via Mathematical Programming Models

1970 • 34 citations

On the Observational Equivalence of Managerial Contracts Under Conditions of Moral Hazard and Self-Selection

1988 • 29 citations

Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly

1984 • 27 citations

Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts

1988 • 26 citations

Cooperation Through Delegation

1987 • 19 citations

The value of communication in agency contracts : theory and experimental evidence

1990 • 18 citations

Optimal employment contracts and the returns to monitoring in a principal‐agent context

1990 • 16 citations

Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships

1987 • 14 citations

Conditional Monitoring Policy Under Moral Hazard

1992 • 12 citations

Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts

1988 • 9 citations

Explorations in the Theory of Single- and Multiple-Agent Agencies

1988 • 6 citations

Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts

1988 • 4 citations

Informativeness and value of public information : an experimental test

1988 • 2 citations

Deleted Work

1955 • 0 citations