Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts

The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities

1973 • 29,036 citations

Separation of Ownership and Control

1983 • 18,225 citations

Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm

1980 • 10,487 citations

Moral Hazard and Observability

1979 • 8,356 citations

Schooling, Experience, and Earnings

1974 • 6,405 citations

Optimal Statistical Decisions.

1972 • 3,636 citations

Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications

1981 • 3,218 citations

An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

1992 • 2,102 citations

Corporate performance and managerial remuneration

1985 • 1,819 citations

Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance

1985 • 1,299 citations

The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

1985 • 888 citations

The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization

1976 • 873 citations

A Theory of Wage Dynamics

1982 • 851 citations

Experience, Performance, and Earnings

1980 • 699 citations

Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard

1983 • 335 citations

A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation of Information

1982 • 99 citations

How Close to an Auction Is the Labor Market? Employee Risk Aversion, Income Uncertainty, and Optimal Labor Contracts

1980 • 8 citations