Explorations in the Theory of Single- and Multiple-Agent Agencies

Moral Hazard and Observability

1979 • 8,356 citations

Moral Hazard in Teams

1982 • 4,935 citations

Theory of Point Estimation

1999 • 4,508 citations

Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts

1981 • 4,164 citations

An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

1992 • 2,102 citations

An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

1983 • 2,019 citations

Theory of Extremal Problems

1979 • 1,653 citations

The theory of contracts

1987 • 1,374 citations

Theory of Point Estimation

1983 • 1,281 citations

Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition

1983 • 1,039 citations

Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition

1983 • 1,034 citations

A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts

1983 • 1,000 citations

The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

1985 • 888 citations

The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization

1976 • 873 citations

An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives

1986 • 721 citations

Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market

1962 • 658 citations

Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market

1992 • 604 citations

The Theory of Statistical Inference

1973 • 574 citations

Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents

1984 • 541 citations

The Theory of Statistical Inference.

1972 • 452 citations

Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem

1982 • 193 citations

The Theory of Syndicates and Linear Sharing Rules

1983 • 56 citations

Multiple Signals, Statistical Sufficiency, and Pareto Orderings of Best Agency Contracts

1989 • 29 citations

Optimal incentive schemes

1980 • 12 citations

Blackwell Informativeness and Sufficient Statistics with Applications to Financial Markets and Multiperson Agencies

1988 • 12 citations

Implementable equilibria in accounting contexts: An exploratory study*

1988 • 8 citations