Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy With Unobservable Goals

Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans

1977 • 7,667 citations

Forecasting, Structural Time Series Models and the Kalman Filter

1991 • 5,040 citations

Strategic Information Transmission

1982 • 4,220 citations

A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information

1986 • 1,314 citations

Optimal contracts for central bankers

1995 • 1,191 citations

Central Banking in Theory and Practice

1998 • 1,008 citations

Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics

2012 • 764 citations

Designing institutions for monetary stability

1993 • 564 citations

Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information

1984 • 452 citations

Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?

2000 • 383 citations

Changes in UK monetary policy: Rules and discretion in practice

1997 • 356 citations

Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking

1986 • 298 citations

In‡ation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring In‡ation Targets

1996 • 250 citations

New Techniques to Extract Market Expectations from Financial Instruments

1997 • 245 citations

Crucial issues concerning central bank independence

1997 • 240 citations

Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcments

1989 • 211 citations

Rules versus discretion in monetary policy

1990 • 150 citations

The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy

1999 • 127 citations

Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views

1996 • 65 citations

The Credibility of Monetary Announcements

1986 • 33 citations

The Dynamics of Optimal Gradual Stabilizations

1992 • 32 citations

WHY DOESN'T SOCIETY MINIMIZE CENTRAL BANK SECRECY?

1991 • 26 citations

Why Central Banks Announce their Objectives : Monetary Policy with Discretionary Signalling

1998 • 4 citations

Computational Economics and Economic Theory: Substitutes or Complements

1997 • 2 citations

CREDIBILITY, AMBIGUITY AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WITH WAGE STICKINESS*

1994 • 1 citations

Can Ignorance Make Central Banks Behave?: Instrument Uncertainty and the Inflationary Bias Problem

1995 • 1 citations