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Repurchase Tender Offers, Signaling, and Managerial Incentives

Data up to Jan 2025

Published1984
Citations262
References20

Total Citations Per Year

Abstract

References (20)

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1976 • 62,465 citations

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1981 • 1,054 citations

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1981 • 737 citations

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1980 • 599 citations

The effects of capital structure change on security prices

1980 • 541 citations

The association between performance plan adoption and corporate capital investment

1983 • 415 citations

Some economic determinants of accounting policy choice

1979 • 394 citations

Signaling and the Valuation of Unseasoned New Issues

1982 • 379 citations

Stock Repurchase by Tender Offer: An Analysis of the Causes of Common Stock Price Changes

1980 • 273 citations

Determinants of the corporate decision to capitalize interest

1981 • 250 citations

Evidence on the effect of bond covenants and management compensation contracts on the choice of accounting techniques

1981 • 210 citations

Standstill agreements, privately negotiated stock repurchases, and the market for corporate control

1983 • 179 citations

The wealth effects of targeted share repurchases

1983 • 163 citations

Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions

1981 • 60 citations

Repurchase offers : information adjusted premiums and shareholders' response

1982 • 20 citations

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Repurchase Tender Offers, Signaling, and Managerial Incentives (1984) – Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis | Metascience Observatory Explorer