Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Social Choice and Individual Values.

1951 • 8,132 citations

Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

1973 • 3,182 citations

The Theory of Committees and Elections.

1959 • 2,908 citations

Collective Choice and Social Welfare

1972 • 2,698 citations

The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal

1970 • 1,293 citations

Theory of voting

1969 • 640 citations

Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules

1960 • 405 citations

Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions

1969 • 306 citations

Stability in Voting

1961 • 176 citations

Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto Optimality

1973 • 70 citations

Lotteries and social choices

1972 • 51 citations

Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting

1976 • 38 citations

Strategic Voting Without Collusion Under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules

1975 • 26 citations

Stability of sincere voting under some classes of non-binary group decision procedures

1974 • 25 citations

The Possibility of a Cheatproof Social Choice Function: A Theorem of A. Gibbard and M. Satterthwaite

1974 • 17 citations

Comments on Hansson's "Group Preferences"

1970 • 14 citations