Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

1976 • 62,465 citations

Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have

1984 • 18,167 citations

Moral Hazard and Observability

1979 • 8,356 citations

The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.

1973 • 4,084 citations

Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications

1981 • 3,218 citations

An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

1992 • 2,102 citations

An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

1983 • 2,019 citations

Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem

1985 • 1,888 citations

Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship

1979 • 1,304 citations

Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information

1979 • 963 citations

Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information

1987 • 906 citations

The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

1985 • 888 citations

Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing

1987 • 572 citations

Limited liability contracts between principal and agent

1983 • 551 citations

Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

1988 • 527 citations

Executive Effort and Selection of Risky Projects

1986 • 348 citations

Perquisites, Risk, and Capital Structure

1987 • 153 citations

Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Question of Financial Structure

1986 • 124 citations

Incentive Structures Maximizing Residual Gain under Incomplete Information

1978 • 120 citations

Risk Sharing and the Theory of the Firm

1982 • 62 citations

Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankruptcy constraints

1988 • 61 citations

Bonuses and Penalties in Incentive Contracting

1980 • 43 citations

Perquisites, Risk, and Capital Structure

1987 • 33 citations

Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Question of Financial Structure

1986 • 22 citations