Nucleus and Shield: The Evolution of Social Structure in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Data up to Jan 2025
Total Citations Per Year
Abstract
References (39)
Adaptation in natural and artificial systems
1975 • 36,178 citations
An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change.
1983 • 22,584 citations
The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration
1984 • 20,858 citations
The Evolution of Cooperation
1981 • 20,191 citations
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
1992 • 19,853 citations
A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice
1955 • 14,167 citations
Introduction to automata theory, languages and computation
1981 • 11,042 citations
The Selfish Gene
1976 • 10,856 citations
Culture and the Evolutionary Process
1986 • 7,192 citations
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
1986 • 2,378 citations
The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts
1974 • 2,353 citations
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
1996 • 2,205 citations
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
1993 • 2,093 citations
Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.
1958 • 2,020 citations
Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences
1989 • 2,004 citations
Evolutionary Games in Economics
1991 • 1,596 citations
Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action
1986 • 1,499 citations
The theory of evolution and dynamical systems
1988 • 1,349 citations
The Further Evolution of Cooperation
1988 • 846 citations
Social Networks and Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass. III
1988 • 638 citations
Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
1986 • 612 citations
The Micro-macro link
1987 • 585 citations
The law of large numbers with a continuum of IID random variables
1985 • 524 citations
No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
1987 • 430 citations
The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
1988 • 394 citations
Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
1992 • 373 citations
Community, Anarchy, and Liberty.
1985 • 370 citations
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games
1990 • 299 citations
Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, nash and the secret handshake
1990 • 281 citations
Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game
1989 • 232 citations
The Economics of Bargaining
1990 • 226 citations
The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment
1985 • 216 citations
Costly optimizers versus cheap imitators
1980 • 208 citations
The evolutionary emergence of norms
1982 • 155 citations
"An Eye for an Eye Leaves Everyone Blind": Cooperation and Accounting Systems
1993 • 136 citations
Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory.
1992 • 116 citations
Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
1992 • 86 citations
The Limits of Reciprocity
1991 • 47 citations
Annotated bibliography on The Evolution of Cooperation
1994 • 28 citations