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Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees

Data up to Jan 2025

Published1998
Citations316
References19

Total Citations Per Year

Abstract

References (19)

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Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from… (1998) – American Economic Review | Metascience Observatory Explorer