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Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents

Data up to Jan 2025

Published1984
Citations339
References20

Total Citations Per Year

Abstract

References (20)

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1979 • 8,356 citations

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1982 • 4,935 citations

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1992 • 2,102 citations

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1979 • 2,028 citations

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1983 • 2,019 citations

Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs

1982 • 1,767 citations

Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship

1979 • 1,304 citations

Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition

1983 • 1,039 citations

Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition

1983 • 1,034 citations

A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts

1983 • 1,000 citations

Comparison of Experiments

1951 • 980 citations

Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information

1979 • 963 citations

Limited liability contracts between principal and agent

1983 • 551 citations

Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation

1982 • 488 citations

Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information

1981 • 455 citations

Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation and Control Systems

1980 • 375 citations

Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability.

1952 • 178 citations

Optimal Regulation of Research and Development under Imperfect Information

1982 • 69 citations

Multi-agent control in perfectly correlated environments

1983 • 28 citations

Precontractual information asymmetry between principal and agent

1980 • 4 citations

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Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (1984) – Journal of Economic Theory | Metascience Observatory Explorer