Announcements, Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Incentives

Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence

1992 • 1,454 citations

A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information

1986 • 1,314 citations

Inflation and Reputation

1985 • 687 citations

Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility

1992 • 617 citations

Designing institutions for monetary stability

1993 • 564 citations

SIGNALLING IN A MODEL OF MONETARY POLICY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION *

1986 • 541 citations

Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information

1984 • 452 citations

Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers

1994 • 357 citations

Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts

1997 • 290 citations

Independence and Accountability

1997 • 127 citations

Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information

1991 • 104 citations

Time-consistent policy and persistent changes in inflation

1995 • 103 citations

Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences

1998 • 79 citations

In Defense of Base Drift

1986 • 35 citations

Base drift and the longer run growth of M1 : experience from a decade of monetary targeting

1984 • 30 citations

Credibility of policy announcements

1989 • 27 citations

WHY DOESN'T SOCIETY MINIMIZE CENTRAL BANK SECRECY?

1991 • 26 citations

CENTRAL BANK SECRECY, INTEREST RATES, AND MONETARY CONTROL

1993 • 23 citations

Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Central Bank Accountability

1997 • 14 citations

Incentive Contracts for Central Bankers under Uncertainty: Walsh-Svensson non-Equivalence Revisited

1998 • 13 citations

REPUTATIONAL CONSTRAINT AND SIGNALLING EFFECTS IN A MONETARY POLICY GAME

1990 • 4 citations

Monetary announcements and monetary policy credibility

1993 • 3 citations