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When does delegation improve credibility? Central Bank independence and the separation of powers

Data up to Jan 2025

Published1998
Citations34
References23

Total Citations Per Year

Abstract

References (23)

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When does delegation improve credibility? Central Bank independence and the separation of… (1998) – RePEc: Research Papers in Economics | Metascience Observatory Explorer